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SUMMARY  
Information and communication is critical to the successful management of infectious diseases 
because an effective communication strategy prevents the surge of anxious patients who have 
not been genuinely exposed to the pathogen ('low risk patients') affecting medical 
infrastructures (1) and the future transmission of the infectious agent (2).  
Surge of low risk patients 
The arrival of large numbers of low risk patients at hospitals following an infectious diseases 
emergency would be problematic for three main reasons. First, it would complicate the 
situation at hospitals receiving exposed patients, delaying the treatment of the acutely ill, 
creating difficulties of crowd control and tying up medical resources. Second, for the low risk 
patients themselves, attending hospital following an infectious disease emergency might 
increase their risk of exposure to the agent in question. Third, the needs of low risk patients 
may be poorly attended to at hospitals which are already overstretched dealing with medical 
casualties.  
Future transmission 
Obtaining early information about symptoms and isolating infected patients is the most 
effective strategy to interrupt the chain of infection in the public in the absence of specific 
prophylaxis or treatment. Particularly at the beginning of an outbreak, these non-
pharmaceutical interventions play an important role in enabling the early detection of signs or 
symptoms and in encouraging passengers to adopt appropriate preventive behaviour in order to 
limit the spread of the disease.  
This thesis includes two papers dealing with this problem:  
The first part is a systemic literature review of information needs following an infectious 
disease emergency (Anthrax, SARS, Pneumonic Plague). The key question was: what are the 
information needs of the public during an infectious disease emergency? 
The second part is an empirical investigation of information needs and communication 
strategies at the airport during the early stage of the Influenza Pandemic. The key question here 
was: what communication strategies help to meet the information needs and to enable the 
public to behave appropriately and responsibly?  
 
Conclusions 
Evidence from the anthrax attacks in the United States suggested that a surge of low risk 
patients is by no means inevitable. Data from the SARS outbreak illustrated that if hospitals are 
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may delay seeking help. Finally, the events surrounding the Pneumonic Plague outbreak of 
1994 in Surat, India, highlighted the need for the public to be kept adequately informed about 
an incident to avoid creating rumours. Clear, consistent and credible information is key to the 
successful management of infectious disease outbreaks.  
The results of the empirical investigation suggested that the desire for information is a 
reflection of current anxiety and does not mirror the objective scientific assessment of 
exposure. The airport study showed that perceived information needs were directly related to 
anxiety – the least anxious did not require any further information, the most anxious reported 
significant information needs concerning medical treatment, public health management and the 
assessment of the ongoing situation – irrespective of their actual exposure. A communication 
strategy only focussing on the 'real' exposed individuals neglects the information needs of those 
worrying about having contracted the virus and seeking medical attendance.  
Effective communication strategies should enable the general public to detect early signs or 
symptoms and provide them with behaviour advice to prevent the further transmission of the 
infectious agent. These include the provision of clear information about the incident, the 
symptoms and what to do to prevent the further transmission, detailed and regularly updated 
information in various media formats (telephone, internet, etc.) and rapid triage at hospital 
entrances to guide patients to the appropriate medical infrastructures. 
 
Relevance 
These research findings could contribute to a shift in the organisational and communicative 
approach responding to infectious diseases outbreaks and could be considered relevant for 
future risk communication and policy decision making.  PETRA DICKMANN  INFORMATION NEEDS AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES EMERGENCIES  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Information und Kommunikation sind die zentralen Momente im Management von 
Infektionskrankheiten, weil eine effektive Kommunikationsstrategie zum einen den Ansturm 
auf die medizinischen Infrastrukturen kanalisiert (1) und zum anderen durch die Informationen 
zum angemessenen Verhalten die weitere Übertragung des Krankheitserregers vermeidet (2).  
Ansturm auf medizinische Infrastrukturen 
Ein großer Ansturm von nicht direkt exponierten Patienten (sogenannte „Low Risk Patients“) 
auf medizinische Infrastrukturen während Infektionsausbrüchen ist aus drei Gründen 
problematisch: Erstens verschärft dieser Ansturm die ohnehin schon schwierige Lage in den 
Krankenhäuser und führt dazu, dass Schwerkranke aus Kapazitätsgründen nicht angemessen 
versorgt werden können. Zweitens erhöht der Aufenthalt in der Notaufnahme eines 
Krankenhauses während eines Infektionsgeschehens die Infektionsgefährdung. Drittens ist 
durch die Kapazitätsausschöpfung nicht gewährleistet, dass „Low Risk Patients“ entsprechend 
ihrer medizinischen Indikation adäquat versorgt werden. 
Weitere Übertragung des Krankheitserregers 
Die frühzeitige Information über Symptome, Übertragungswege und angemessenes Verhalten 
führt dazu, dass symptomatische Patienten isoliert und die weitere Verbreitung des 
Krankheitserregers durch ein adäquates Infektionsschutzverhalten gestoppt wird. Diese nicht-
pharmazeutischen Maßnahmen sind insbesondere in der Frühphase von Infektionsausbrüchen, 
in denen noch keine Impfungen oder Therapien zur Verfügung stehen, von hoher Relevanz und 
helfen sowohl die symptomatischen Patienten zu identifizieren als auch die Bevölkerung mit 
einem angemessenen Verhalten zu schützen.  
In dieser Dissertation werden zwei Arbeiten zusammengefasst, die dieser Problematik 
nachgehen: den ersten Teil bildet eine systematische Literaturübersicht über die publizierten 
Daten zu den Informationsbedürfnissen und zum adäquaten Verhalten während 
Infektionsausbrüchen am Beispiel von Anthrax, SARS und der Lungenpest. Leitfrage dieser 
Studie ist: Was sind die Informationsbedürfnisse der Öffentlichkeit während eines 
Infektionsgeschehens?  
Den zweiten Teil bildet eine empirische Erhebung am Flughafen zu den 
Informationsbedürfnissen und Kommunikationsstrategien zu Beginn der Influenza Pandemie. 
Leitend bei dieser Studie ist die Frage, welche Kommunikationsstrategien den 
Informationsbedürfnissen adäquat sind und gleichzeitig die Öffentlichkeit in die Lage versetzt, 
sich angemessen zu verhalten?  PETRA DICKMANN  INFORMATION NEEDS AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES EMERGENCIES  
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Ergebnisse 
Die Anthrax Anschläge in den USA haben gezeigt, dass es nicht unbedingt zu einem 
Massenansturm von „Low Risk Patients“ kommen muss, wenn die Informationen über 
Diagnostik und therapeutische Maßnahmen adäquat kommuniziert werden. Aus den 
Erfahrungen von SARS konnte man sehen, dass auch die umgekehrte Situation Probleme 
schafft: wenn Patienten, die medizinische Behandlung benötigen, nicht die medizinischen 
Infrastrukturen aufsuchen, weil diese selbst zum Ort der Ansteckung geworden sind, kann das 
dramatische medizinische Folgen haben. Der Ausbruch der Lungenpest in Indien, verknüpft in 
ein Netz von Gerüchten, hat deutlich gemacht, wie wichtig die umfassend und aktuell korrekt 
informierte Öffentlichkeit ist.  
Die Ergebnisse aus der empirischen Arbeit am Flughaben belegen, dass das 
Informationsbedürfnis nicht an die wissenschaftlich-medizinische Einschätzung der Exposition 
und des objektiven Ansteckungsrisikos geknüpft ist, sondern vielmehr die eigene 
Wahrnehmung und das Gefühl einer möglichen Ansteckung reflektiert. Diejenigen, die am 
meisten Angst vor Ansteckung hatten, artikulierten auch den größten Informationsbedarf, 
während diejenigen, die sich ausreichend informiert fühlten, auch nur eine geringe Besorgnis 
zum Ausdruck brachten. Diese Relation wurde unabhängig der objektiven Exposition 
beobachtet. Eine Kommunikationsstrategie, die nur die objektiv Exponierten adressiert, zielt 
also an denjenigen vorbei, die – exponiert oder nicht – besorgt sind und aufgrund dieser Sorge 
zu einem Problem der medizinischen Infrastrukturen werden können.  
Eine effektive Kommunikation sollte die Öffentlichkeit in die Lage versetzen, die 
entsprechenden Symptome frühzeitig zu erkennen und sich sowohl bei Erkrankung, als auch 
bei der Unterbrechung der Infektionskette adäquat zu verhalten. Dazu braucht es klare, aktuelle 
und glaubwürdige Informationen über das Ausbruchsgeschehen, die Symptome und das 
Schutzverhalten, kontinuierliche Kommunikation über verschiedene mediale Formate (Telefon, 
Internet, etc.), schnelle Triage in den Krankenhäusern und eine kompetente Führung, um 
festlegen zu können, welcher Patient in den spezifischen medizinischen Infrastrukturen am 
besten aufgehoben ist.  
Relevanz 
Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit können dazu betragen, dass eine verbesserte Risiko- und 
Krisenkommunikation das Management von Infektionskrankheiten der politischen 
Entscheidungsträger erleichtert.   PETRA DICKMANN  INFORMATION NEEDS AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES EMERGENCIES  
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
This dissertation contains two articles (one published and one submitted) about the behaviour 
and information needs of the public in the context of an infectious disease emergency (IDE) 
caused by a deliberate release in a bioterrorist scenario (Anthrax), an emerging or re-emerging 
pathogen (SARS and Plague) or an Influenza pandemic. These incidents were chosen because 
they represent a matrix of incidents with enormous medical, social and economic impact: a 
bioterrorist attack, an emerging or re-emerging disease and a rapidly and globally spreading 
disease. 
 
Systematic Literature Review 
The first part of this dissertation is a systematic literature review which assessed the impact of 
three outbreaks (Anthrax, SARS, Pneumonic Plague) on public behaviour in terms of 
attendance at healthcare facilities. 
The key questions were: what is known about what the public wants to know? And: are there 
predictors of behaviour in response to infectious diseases outbreaks? 
 
Method 
A systematic search was made of Medline to identify publications that might contain data 
relevant to this review. A summary of the search strategy used is provided in Appendix A.  
Papers were only selected for inclusion in this review if they:  
•  related to a general public sample (excluding, for example, studies of health care, 
emergency service or military personnel)  
•  related to one of the three outbreaks selected for study (Anthrax (2001 – “Amerithrax”), 
SARS (2003) or Pneumonic Plague in Surat/India (1994
1) and 
                                            
1 The outbreak of Pneumonic Plague in Surat/India lasted from August 26, 1994 to October 18, 1994. PETRA DICKMANN  INFORMATION NEEDS AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES EMERGENCIES  
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•  contained relevant data concerning the prevalence of low risk patients, the predictors of 
health anxiety or behavioural response among low risk patients, or the information 
needs of low risk patients.  
 
Papers were excluded if they consisted of: 
•  Exercises or hypothetical scenarios 
•  Articles published in languages other than English.  
For the Anthrax and SARS outbreaks, papers expressing only expert opinion or anecdotal 
evidence were excluded. Given the paucity of relevant data that were available for the 1994 
outbreak of pneumonic plague in Surat, however, for this incident such evidence was included 
where relevant.  
The results of the review are presented narratively, broken down according to disease.  
 
Organisational Remarks 
This literature review was part of a programme of research being conducted by King’s College 
London and the Health Protection Agency, entitled ‘Behavioural Responses to Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Incidents.’ This research was funded under the Home 
Office CBRN Science and Technology Programme (study reference: 43/05/81). I was invited 
to take part in the research project while I was doing my medical elective period at the King’s 
College Hospital, Institute of Psychiatry (Prof. Wessely), in March-April 2008. The research 
took place until September 2008 and we submitted the research report to the Home Office on 
October 1
st, 2008. This literature review (Rubin & Dickmann: How to Reduce the Impact of 
‘Low Risk Patients’ following a Bioterrorist Incident: Lessons Learned from SARS, Anthrax 
and Pneumonic Plague) was accepted for publication in December 2009 by the journal 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism. Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science in their March issue.  
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Empirical Investigation 
The second part of this dissertation is an empirical investigation about the information needs of 
the public during an infectious disease emergency. With the beginning of the Influenza 
A/H1N1 epidemic (April 29-30, 2009) we conducted qualitative semi structured interviews at 
Frankfurt International Airport within the highest security zone of the primary security line of 
the gates
2 with passengers who were either returning from or going to Mexico and with airport 
staff who had close contact with these passengers. These interviews focused on knowledge 
about swine flu, information needs and anxiety concerning the outbreak. The aim of the study 
was to determine the adequacy of the information provided to airport passengers and staff in 
meeting their information needs.  
The leading question was: what does the public want to know – and are knowledge and 
information adapted into behaviour? 
 
The collection of empirical data took place on the third day (April 29, 2009) of public health 
measures at the airport and concerns the very early stage of the management of a pandemic, 
which may have implications for how we react to future outbreaks and evolving pandemics. 
 
Common Perspective 
The two studies are two sides of the same coin, while the first relates to more extreme 
behavioural reactions among unexposed members of the public (seeking healthcare) and is 
necessarily literature-based given that it was conducted prior to the pandemic, the second is 
based on lower levels of concern that can still have an impact on behaviours such as reporting 
of symptoms. 
The leading question of the first part was: what is known and what data is available about 
information needs and predictors of behavioural response to infectious disease? The second 
                                            
2 According to the EU Law and the International Health Regulations (IHR) the primary security line means the physical set of barriers of the 
airport that separate the unrestricted landside area from the restricted airside area PETRA DICKMANN  INFORMATION NEEDS AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES EMERGENCIES  
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part though provides data about the information needs, describes the evolving situation and 
concludes with recommendations for risk and crisis communication strategies.  
Both parts follow their own structure regarding format, quotation style and literature which was 
due to meet the requirements of the respective journal.  
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Abstract 
A bioterrorist attack may result in a large number of unexposed patients attending medical 
facilities in search of treatment or reassurance. In this paper, we review evidence from three 
previous biological incidents that are analogous to a bioterrorist attack in order to gauge the 
likely incidence of such ‘low risk patients’ and to identify possible strategies for coping with 
this phenomenon. Evidence from the anthrax attacks in the United States suggested that a 
surge of low risk patients is by no means inevitable. Data from the SARS outbreak illustrated 
that if hospitals are seen as sources of contagion, many patients with non-bioterrorism related 
health care needs may delay seeking help. Finally, the events surrounding the pneumonic 
plague outbreak of 1994 in Surat, India, highlighted the need for the public to be kept 
adequately informed about an incident. Although it is impossible to say what the likely 
incidence of low risk patients will be during a future bioterrorist incident, several strategies 
may help to reduce it and to safeguard the well-being of the low risk patients themselves. 
These include the provision of clear information about who should and should not attend 
hospital, the use of telephone services to provide more detailed information and initial 
screening, rapid triage at hospital entrances based where possible on exposure history and 
objective signs of illness, and subsequent telephone follow-up of those judged to be at low 
risk. (232 words) 
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Introduction 
Bioterrorism has the potential to place great strain on a region's medical services. While 
patients requiring emergency care may represent a substantial caseload, a greater issue may 
be the accompanying influx of unexposed patients who wish to be assessed, decontaminated 
and treated. Many of these patients may report physical symptoms that can be hard to 
differentiate from the symptoms of exposure to a bioterrorist agent, but which have their 
origin in psychological mechanisms or are the result of other conditions that are unrelated to 
the attack
1;2. Other patients may attend hospital with acute psychological distress, due to 
exacerbation of a psychiatric disorder, or because they wish to obtain more information about 
the incident. Finding an appropriate term for this heterogeneous group is difficult. The phrase 
‘worried well’ which is sometimes used is now seen as disparaging, inaccurate and unhelpful 
and should no longer be applied. A better term may be "low risk patient"
3. While identifying 
which individual patients are genuinely at low risk may present difficulties in some incidents, 
particularly those where exposure status is difficult to confirm, for other incidents the term is 
easier to apply. The phrase also allows for a degree of uncertainty about risk status and has 
reassuring connotations for the patient.    
 
The arrival of large numbers of low risk patients at hospitals following bioterrorism would be 
problematic for three main reasons
3-5. First, it would complicate the situation at hospitals 
receiving exposed patients, delaying the treatment of the acutely ill, creating difficulties of 
crowd control and tying up medical resources. Second, for the low risk patients themselves, 
attending hospital following a bioterrorist attack might increase their risk of exposure to the 
agent in question, as well as their risk of misdiagnoses and inappropriate treatment. Third, the 
needs of low risk patients may be poorly attended to at hospitals which are already 
overstretched dealing with medical casualties. Although not direct victims of the attack per  
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se, many low risk patients nonetheless have genuine healthcare needs and require suitable 
reassurance. If inappropriately handled, the potential exists for the physical symptoms and 
distress experienced by some of these patients to become chronic problems
2. 
 
Although concern exists about the likelihood of a surge of low risk patients affecting 
hospitals and other health care resources following bioterrorism, little is known about the 
characteristics of such a phenomenon or the possible interventions that might ameliorate it. In 
this report, we review the incidence and impact of low risk patients in relation to three 
previous infectious disease incidents; the anthrax attacks in the USA during 2001, the 
outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2002 and 2003, and the outbreak of 
pneumonic plague in Surat in 1994. These outbreaks were chosen because they represent a 
genuine bioterrorist attack (anthrax
6), a natural outbreak of a potential bioterrorism agent 
which at the time was widely rumoured to be a deliberate release (pneumonic plague
7) and a 
major outbreak of a novel emerging pathogen which required some hospitals to activate their 
bioterrorism protocols in order to cope with the incident (SARS
8). Data relating to these 
incidents are used to characterise likely low risk patient behaviours and to suggest possible 
strategies for dealing with them.   
 
Methods 
A search of Medline allowed us to identify publications that might contain relevant data 
(search strategy available on request). For the anthrax and SARS outbreaks, papers 
expressing only expert opinion or anecdotal evidence were excluded. However, given the 
paucity of relevant data for the pneumonic plague outbreak in Surat, such evidence was 
included where relevant for this incident.  
  
RUBIN & DICKMANN (2009):   HOW TO REDUCE THE IMPACT OF ‘LOW RISK PATIENTS’ FOLLOWING A BIOTERRORIST INCIDENT 
Page 14 
Results  
Anthrax 
Impact on attendance at hospitals and other health care facilities 
We identified one study which provided quantitative data on changing patterns of hospital 
usage during the time period of the US anthrax attacks
9. According to this retrospective 
analysis for 15 New Jersey emergency departments, all within a 55 mile radius of one of the 
anthrax incidents, an increase in the number of patients whose notes indicated that they were 
“screened for infectious disease” but who had “no diagnosis of feared complaint” occurred 
immediately after the first local anthrax case was identified
9. In absolute terms, however, this 
increase represented only 0.92% of all emergency department visits during that period, 
although for the two hospitals closest to the affected postal facility this figure doubled to 
1.8%
9. A second study, concerning one large primary care facility in New York, also noted a 
rise in patient visits following the attacks compared with either the previous or subsequent 
years
10. However, out of all 30,456 contacts with patients that were recorded by the practice 
between 11 September and 21 December 2001, only 244 involved any patient-initiated 
discussion about bioterrorism (0.8%). Of the 241 individual patients involved, 97 reported 
potential exposure (either to a white powder or because of working in a mail room) and 110 
reported subjective symptoms. Twenty-one percent requested antibiotics
10.  
 
Surveys of the general public confirmed that there was a relatively low level of health care 
use among low risk individuals as a direct result of the anthrax attacks. Only 5% in one 
survey reported that they, or anyone else in their household, had spoken to a doctor about 
health issues relating to bioterrorism, while only 3% reported that they or someone else from 
the household had spoken to a health professional about their anxieties relating to the 
attacks
11. These data do hide a degree of variability however: within areas involved in an  
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incident, individuals who reported that they, a close friend or a family member had been 
caught up in the anthrax events were more likely to have spoken to a physician about anthrax-
related concerns or anxiety, or to have obtained a prescription for antibiotics
11.  
 
Demand for antibiotics 
Evidence was found that some low risk US citizens requested, and received, prescriptions for 
ciprofloxacin and doxycycline (the two antibiotics recommended as primary prophylactic 
agents against anthrax). One assessment of prescriptions given out by pharmacies across the 
US noted large increases in the distribution of both drugs in October 2001compared to 
October 2000, despite relative stability in prescriptions for other antibiotics, with prescribing 
of the two drugs increasing by roughly 160,000 and 96,000 courses, respectively
12. This does 
not imply that these drugs were actually consumed, however; stockpiling by concerned 
members of the public may also explain the increase. For instance, general public surveys 
found that while 4% reported that they, or someone else in the household, had obtained a 
prescription for antibiotics, less than 0.5% had actually taken the medication
11. This increased 
prescribing of antibiotics to low risk patients was also identified by others, using both 
prescribing trend data and surveys of physicians
10;13;14.   
 
Impact on other health-care resources 
During the attacks, telephone hotlines were set up to deal with calls from the public or 
healthcare professionals. These came under some pressure. One location received 25,000 
such calls during a two week period, while nine other states recorded 2,817 calls during the 
course of a week
6. During one month, the CDC Emergency Operations Centre logged 11,063 
anthrax related calls, of which only 882 were referred to a second tier State Liaison Team
15. 
Although most of these related to low risk patients, only 20% of these calls actually came  
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from members of the public, with most coming from healthcare workers and state or federal 
employees. As such, the hotline does not seem to have been used primarily by people seeking 
reassurance for symptoms unrelated to exposure. Instead, the commonest reason for calling 
related to requests for general bioterrorism information
15. As well as phoning call centres, US 
citizens also turned to the internet during the attacks to obtain more information
11, with use of 
the www.cdc.gov website increasing by 100%
16.  
 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
Overall impact on health-care resources  
One key feature of the SARS outbreak was the high number of hospital acquired infections 
that occurred; of 8096 cases, 1706 (21%) occurred in health care workers
17. This had a major 
impact on the number of patients attending hospital for any reason during the outbreak. Using 
a retrospective review of charts in one Taiwanese hospital assigned to accept SARS patients, 
Huang et al reported a 44% reduction in adult patients attending the emergency department 
during the peak of the outbreak
18. This reduction occurred primarily in patients with a less 
urgent need to be seen; no change was found in the number of patients arriving by 
ambulance, with a critical or life threatening illness or requiring admission to a ward or to 
intensive care. Many other hospitals reported similar declines in non-SARS related visits
19-24, 
while data from Taiwan’s National Health Insurance program showed significant declines in 
expenditure for both ambulatory and inpatient care during the period of the outbreak
25. 
Further analysis of insurance data showed that reductions were particularly evident for 
respiratory diseases, minor problems and elective surgery, and less so for acute conditions, 
mental disorders or essential treatment that could not be postponed
26.  
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Why did hospitals witness such reductions in patient numbers? The periodic closure of 
services, public appeals for patients with minor illnesses to stay away and concern among 
some members of the public about possible detention if they were found to be febrile may all 
have contributed
19;21;23;27. But given that declines in hospital attendance also tended to be 
linked to media reporting of SARS cases, that an increase in patients discharging themselves 
from hospital against medical advice was observed, and that the general public endorsed 
staying away from hospitals as a useful way of avoiding SARS, it seems probable that fear of 
acquiring SARS was a key reason for the reductions
21;24;28.  
 
Importantly, though, while non-essential use of hospitals declined, this does not mean that 
patients no longer sought help for non-SARS related conditions. Instead, a shift in the way 
that help was sought was identified in several studies. For example, in Toronto, both 
Telehealth Ontario (a 24 hour medical advice line) and primary care physicians reported a 
large increase in the number of consultations being given by phone
23. Meanwhile analysis of 
health insurance data suggested that for certain conditions, smaller district hospitals and 
clinics (which were less willing or able to take SARS patients) also witnessed an increase in 
patient numbers
26;29.  
 
Use of health-care resources by low risk patients  
Although the most striking finding from the SARS outbreak was the overall fall in patient 
attendance at hospitals, of those who did attend many were low risk patients. For instance, 
Boutis et al. cited otherwise unpublished data from two Toronto hospitals
23. One hospital 
reported screening “more than 1000 concerned members of the public, 70 of whom met the 
case definition of suspected or probable SARS.” The other hospital reported that “up to 50% 
of presenting patients had concerns that their symptoms were SARS-related.” More rigorous  
RUBIN & DICKMANN (2009):   HOW TO REDUCE THE IMPACT OF ‘LOW RISK PATIENTS’ FOLLOWING A BIOTERRORIST INCIDENT 
Page 18 
data were available from Singapore, where the main hospital responsible for treating SARS 
assessed 11,461 patients in a triage centre set up outside the main emergency department 
entrance
8. This process involved checking for the presence of fever and administering a 
simple questionnaire to assess exposure history and symptoms. Of all patients screened in this 
way, only 1,386 (12%) were subsequently admitted to the hospital for further assessment
8. Of 
the remaining 10,075, it subsequently transpired that 28 did have probable or suspected 
SARS and had been misclassified. The remainder (88%) were categorised as low risk, with 
the authors noting that "the majority were either asymptomatic or had minor ailments such as 
upper respiratory tract infection." These patients were provided with education about SARS, 
reassurance, and telephone follow-up over the next two weeks.  
 
This experience was also mirrored in one Taiwanese hospital, which received requests for 
screening from 1,421 “individuals who had no documented fever or exposure history”
30. 
These 1,421 low risk patients, many of whom reported various medically unexplained 
symptoms, accounted for 64% of all potential SARS patients who were seen
30.   
 
As well as attending hospital, low risk patients also accessed other resources. In Taiwan, a 
dedicated SARS fever hotline was set up with the specific intention of triaging patients with 
fever and reducing the number of low risk patients attending hospital
31. A separate telephone 
number for individuals seeking general information rather than medical advice was also 
provided. Within an 11 day period the fever hotline received 11,228 calls. Of these, 28% 
were advised to seek medical assistance, 21% were advised to remain at home and monitor 
their symptoms, while the majority (51%) received general advice but did not require any 
specific medical recommendations. Of callers for whom data were available, only 37% 
actually had a fever.   
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Meanwhile, within Hong Kong, 5% of the public in one survey reported getting health 
information about SARS from medical professionals
28. This contrasts with 19% of Toronto 
residents, and 6% of US residents
32 
 
Pneumonic Plague 
On 19 September 1994 three patients with pneumonic plague were admitted to the New Civil 
Hospital in the Indian city of Surat, triggering a major public health response. In total, the 
incident eventually resulted in 56 deaths
33 and caused enormous public fear and a large-scale 
spontaneous surge of people away from the city. This was partly the result of ill-informed, 
inconsistent or incomplete information given out during the crises
34.  
 
Perhaps the most notable low risk patient behaviour observed across India during this 
outbreak was the intensive and wide-spread purchasing of those medicines that were reported 
in the media to act as a prophylaxis against plague, including tetracycline and a homeopathic 
preparation called phosphorus 30
7;35-37. This ‘panic buying’ placed pressure on stocks of these 
medications
34;35;38. In addition, it was widely recognised at the time that many patients 
arriving at hospital for assessment did not have plague
39. Partly this problem stemmed from 
poor case-definitions and limited triage arrangements. As news reports noted “the standard 
response [from physicians around India] has been to admit patients with ‘plague-like 
symptoms’ to hospital” with doctors “referring many patients with high fever, cough and 
chest pain to the hospitals reserved for cases of plague.” Unfortunately, this loose definition 
also encompassed tuberculosis, pneumonia and malaria
39. In addition to misdiagnosis, self-
referring low risk patients also contributed to the problem, with hospitals in Dehli becoming 
“flooded” with anxious patients
34 while the New Civil Hospital was reported as being  
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“packed with plague and the worried well”
40. As one expert later observed “a little runny 
nose and a cough, you were immediately rushed to the hospital”
34. This phenomenon may go 
some way towards explaining the puzzled comments that some experts made regarding the 
outbreak: “Almost all the patients had mild illness. High fever was uncommon, and a 
significant number had no fever at all. The look of the affected persons failed to reveal that 
they were having a serious disease” 
35.  
 
Discussion 
Estimates of the potential incidence of low risk patients following a future bioterrorist attack 
can vary widely
5. In truth, however, it is impossible to give any firm estimate: while some 
previous examples have resulted in a large number of low risk patients seeking access to 
health care services, other examples such as the anthrax attacks have resulted in less health 
anxiety among the unexposed public. Several factors help to explain why the incidence can 
differ so dramatically. First, the perceived risk associated with the incident is clearly crucial, 
with factors which increase the dread or outrage felt by the public (e.g. Surat), or the 
perceived likelihood of being affected by the incident serving to moderate the likelihood of 
individuals utilizing health care resources. With regard to this latter point, the geographical or 
occupational restriction of any risk and also whether a disease is perceived to be contagious 
or not are clearly key factors to consider (e.g. Anthrax). Second, a population’s perceptions 
about the nature of the agent involved and whether health care services can offer effective 
protection or treatment will also be important. This is true regardless of the validity of these 
perceptions: in Surat, for instance, the wide spread purchasing of tetracycline and phosphorus 
30 was triggered by media reporting of their prophylactic powers, not by the objective 
efficacy of either drug
34.  Third, the perceived risk-benefit trade-off involved in attending 
health-care facilities will also determine how many low risk patients use them. Where  
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hospitals are viewed as potential sources of contagion, as in SARS, this will restrict the 
attendance of low risk patients. Fourth, the availability of alternative resources which meet 
the needs of low risk patients will also be important. This can range from trusted 
organisations providing credible information about when to seek help, to resources 
specifically allocated to assessing, advising and reassuring low risk patients on a one-to-one 
basis
15;31. Finally, even the definition of ‘low risk patient’ will differ across incidents, 
depending on the specific nature of the threat. For example, an overt release of infectious 
material that is identified early may differ from a covert release that goes undetected for some 
time in terms of how authorities must define ‘high risk,’ and hence ‘low risk,’ patients. In 
some circumstances, any patient reporting flu-like symptoms may need to be considered at 
risk, even if this will inevitably include some patients whose symptoms are attributable to 
other causes.  
 
Strategies for reducing the impact of low risk patients  
Our review suggests several strategies which may help to reduce the impact of low risk 
patients following bioterrorism. These largely concur with previous recommendations
3-5. In 
the immediate aftermath of an attack, providing information as quickly as possible about who 
should seek medical attention, and who should not, will be essential
3. Clear, consistent 
messages of this type helped keep patient numbers to manageable levels during the SARS 
outbreak
19;23. In order to reduce attendance by patients with symptoms that are not 
attributable to the incident, such information should ideally specify objective criteria such as 
exposure or fever as the criteria for seeking help. Depending on the incident, however, this 
may not always be possible. Continually updated, credible information concerning the 
incident in general should also be provided. In previous incidents, a substantial motivation for 
low risk patients to interact with the health services has been their desire to obtain more  
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information
10;11;15;31. The use of a continually updated internet resource is one route that may 
help to provide this level of detailed information to concerned members of the public, while 
reducing the pressure on medical services.  
 
Inevitably, however, some people will still wish to discuss their concerns with a clinician. If 
local regulations allow it, then facilities to provide remote, one-to-one advice and assessment 
away from hospitals must therefore also be in place, with telephone consultations remaining 
the most pragmatic way of providing this. Experience from the SARS and anthrax incidents 
suggest that telephone helplines providing general information and preliminary medical 
assessments were used by members of the public who might otherwise have presented at 
hospitals or primary care facilities
15;31.  
 
Regardless of what preventive steps are taken, some low risk patients will nonetheless present 
at hospital or primary care practices. Rapid triage of patients, based wherever possible on 
exposure history or objective clinical signs will therefore be required to identify those 
requiring immediate treatment. While some authors have suggested that “low risk patient 
facilities” or “support centres” be used to house patients turned away from triage points, 
providing a venue in which to give out information and conduct further assessment
3-5, in the 
context of an infectious disease outbreak in which there is a risk of person to person 
transmission a better approach may be to ask patients to return home following triage and 
after the provision of information and reassurance, with the promise that further follow-up by 
telephone will occur
8. This would help to reduce the risk of contagion, allow a patient’s 
psychological state to be assessed over a lengthier time-course, reassure patients that they 
have not been forgotten and provide a secondary stage of triage, allowing patients who were 
initially miscategorised to be identified and recalled to hospital
8.   
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Reductions in the use of medical services during an incident.  
While unnecessary use of health care resources by low risk patients is of concern, our review 
also suggested that consideration be given to patients who require medical help for conditions 
unrelated to an attack but who will either delay seeking help or change the way in which they 
access health care services through fear of coming into contact with the bioterrorist threat. 
This is particularly likely to be the case for infectious diseases with high rates of person to 
person transmission. This phenomenon, observed most clearly in the SARS outbreak, can 
result in dramatic declines in patient numbers at major hospitals, together with increased use 
of smaller facilities and telephone consultations
23. While explicitly demonstrating to patients 
that hospitals remain safe to visit may help to reduce this effect, planners should be aware 
that telephone-based healthcare resources and smaller health-care facilities may require 
additional resources to cope with increased demand following bioterrorism.  
 
Conclusions  
Our review highlighted several key lessons that could be learned from the SARS, anthrax and 
pneumonic plague incidents which may help in preparing for the challenges presented by low 
risk patients following a future terrorist attack. In particular, we have noted several features 
of an incident that may have a large impact on the nature and magnitude of changes in 
behaviour in the unexposed population, we have highlighted the need to plan for decreased 
use of hospitals following a major incident and we have suggested the need for adequate 
telephone facilities to allow low-risk patients to access information, early triage and 
subsequent follow-up, as required.  
 
We would, however, also raise one important caveat. The scientific literature on low risk 
patient behaviour following major incidents is sparse, particularly with regards to good  
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quality data concerning the incidence, motivations or outcomes of low risk patients, or the 
efficacy of different strategies for reducing their impact on the health care services and for 
ensuring that their own well-being is looked after
3. Many of the suggestions contained within 
this paper are thus speculative. A need exists for more research into each of these issues, 
beginning with a prospective cohort study of all patients who present at health care facilities 
following the next major chemical, biological or radiological incident.  
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APPENDIX A 
Search Strategy 
Database: Ovid MEDLINE(R) <1950 to April Week 2 2008> 
Search Strategy: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1     exp Attitude to Health/ or exp Health Services Misuse/ or exp "Patient Acceptance of 
Health Care"/ or exp Managed Care Programs/ or exp Somatoform Disorders/ or exp 
Anxiety/ or worried well.mp. or exp Health Education/  
2     exp Questionnaires/ or exp Needs Assessment/ or exp "Health Services Needs and 
Demand"/ or exp Information Systems/ or exp Health Education/ or exp Patient Education as 
Topic/ or exp Information Services/ or Information Need.mp.  
3     exp Health Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice/ or exp Risk Assessment/ or exp 
Communication/ or risk communication.mp. or exp Risk/  
4     exp Emergency Service, Hospital/ or hospital attendance.mp.  
5     health care.mp. or exp "Delivery of Health Care"/  
6     1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5  
7     exp Anthrax/ or anthrax.mp.  
8     6 and 7  
*************************** 
SEARCHES 7 AND 8 
These searches were adjusted depending on the specific outbreak.  
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Abstract 
Airports are the entrances of infectious diseases. Particularly at the beginning of an outbreak 
information and communication play an important role to enable the early detection of signs 
or symptoms and to encourage passengers to adopt appropriate preventive behaviour in order 
to limit the spread of the disease.  
At the start of the Influenza A/H1N1 epidemic (April 29-30, 2009) qualitative semi structured 
interviews (N=101) were conducted at Frankfurt International Airport with passengers who 
were either returning from or going to Mexico and with airport staff who had close contact 
with these passengers. Interviews focused on knowledge about swine flu, information needs 
and anxiety concerning the outbreak. The aim of the study was to determine the adequacy of 
the information provided to airport passengers and staff in meeting their information needs. 
The results showed that perceived information needs were directly related to anxiety – the 
least anxious participants did not want any additional information, while the most anxious 
participants reported a range of information needs. Information needs were the same 
irrespective of actual or potential exposure. Airport staff in contact with passengers travelling 
from the epicentre of the outbreak showed the highest levels of anxiety, coupled with a desire 
to be adequately briefed by their employer.  
Our results suggest that information strategies should address not only the exposed or 
potentially exposed but also groups that feel at risk; further communication strategies based 
on information about the disease and advice about effective preventive behaviours may be 
particularly useful in the management of infectious diseases. (251 words) 
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Introduction 
Airports are common entrances of infectious diseases and air travel has become the most 
effective transmission route for emerging infectious diseases. Some infectious diseases are 
manageable at the airport with conventional medical screenings like temperature screening 
(Gaber et al. 2009) because patients are only contagious after they show symptoms 
(e.g. SARS; Bell 2004). Other infectious diseases like influenza require special screening 
efforts, because patients may transmit the disease before they show symptoms. Therefore, 
early detection of suspect cases was one priority of public health measures at the beginning of 
the swine flu outbreak. One major strategy was to inform airport passengers about the early 
signs and symptoms of the disease and to communicate advice how to behave, if they suspect 
themselves to suffer from the disease. It was the hope that this could enable and encourage 
travellers to protect themselves and to prevent the spread of infection. Various studies have 
assessed information needs and behavioural changes among the general public in response to 
the swine flu outbreak (e.g. Rubin et al. 2009, Seale et al. 2009, Quinn et al. 2009). However, 
airport passengers and staff represent groups of particular interest, given their high potential 
to spread the disease. Illness in these populations must be detected quickly and adequate 
preventive behaviour has to be effectively encouraged. Promoting awareness of the nature of 
swine flu among these groups may help to ensure that people with symptoms consistent with 
swine flu make themselves known to public health officials and should provide useful 
information about preventive behaviour including strict hygiene.  
This is research about what happened during the earliest stages of the 2009 swine flu 
pandemic, which may have implications for how we react to future outbreaks and evolving 
pandemics (Fraser et al. 2009). Our main assumptions were that obtaining early information 
about symptoms, isolating infected patients and communicating behaviour advice that 
includes practising strict hygiene is the most effective strategy to interrupt the chain of DICKMANN ET AL. (2009): NEW INFLUENZA A/H1N1 (“SWINE FLU”) - INFORMATION NEEDS OF AIRPORT PASSENGERS AND STAFF 
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infection among members of the public in the absence of specific prophylaxis (Barry 2009, 
Funk et al. 2009, Glik 2007). 
 
Public health measures at the airport 
In Germany, public health measures relating to airline travel began on Monday, April 27, 
2009 with on-board screening of, and information provision to, passengers on flights coming 
from Mexico. Roughly 460 passengers per day arrived on direct flights from Mexico and 
were seen by two doctors, one from the airport and one from the health authorities, who 
provided information on board shortly after the plane landed. They also asked for passengers 
who were not feeling well to make themselves known. The detection of ill passengers was 
based on voluntary notice by sick passengers themselves or by appraisal of the doctors. 
Between 27 April and 30 April a leaflet (the ‘airline leaflet’) was given out to passengers at 
Frankfurt airport in three languages (German, English, Spanish). It contained health 
information for travellers coming from affected regions and was designed to raise awareness 
of the symptoms of swine flu and to encourage passengers to contact the flight crew if they 
had these symptoms or to consult a physician if they developed the symptoms within the next 
7 days. The leaflet was based on information given by the German National public health 
institute (the Robert Koch-Institute), the local health authorities and the airport authorities 
(see Additional Material: Passenger leaflet). Other international airports distributed their own 
leaflets; therefore, passengers arriving at Frankfurt had various levels of knowledge and 
information.  
Starting on April 27, airport staff was provided with a different leaflet and a document 
(“reading file”) containing information about the disease and its transmissibility. Staff also 
received a workplace risk assessment which advised against the need for any protective 
equipment. This information highlighted the symptoms of swine flu and advised employees to DICKMANN ET AL. (2009): NEW INFLUENZA A/H1N1 (“SWINE FLU”) - INFORMATION NEEDS OF AIRPORT PASSENGERS AND STAFF 
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contact a physician if they felt ill after close contact with a symptomatic passenger (see 
Additional Material: Staff leaflet). 
 
Aim of the study  
Future outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases are likely to follow a similar pattern with 
rapid spread of the disease through airline travel. We assume that an important measure 
against the spread is to insure knowledge about effective prevention and about the nature of 
the disease. Here, we report the results of qualitative semi structured interviews conducted at 
the beginning of the swine flu outbreak. These interviews were conducted at Frankfurt 
International Airport, one of the world’s major air travel hubs. Interviews were conducted 
with passengers who were either returning from or going to Mexico, the country most 
affected by swine flu at the time, and with airport staff who had close contact with these 
passengers. Participants were assessed with respect to their knowledge, information needs and 
fears concerning the pandemic. Our aim was to determine the adequacy of the information 
provided to passengers and staff in terms of meeting their needs and enabling them to adapt 
their behaviours. 
 
Methods 
The study consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with passengers and 
members of staff at Frankfurt airport. Due to time constraints, a convenience sampling 
method was used, with participants approached as they waited for their bags, queued, or were 
arriving at their airport. 
 
Procedure 
Interviews were conducted on 29 and 30 April within Frankfurt airport. They were conducted 
in the secure areas at the gate, the international bus arrival and baggage reclaim. We DICKMANN ET AL. (2009): NEW INFLUENZA A/H1N1 (“SWINE FLU”) - INFORMATION NEEDS OF AIRPORT PASSENGERS AND STAFF 
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interviewed passengers coming from Cancun and Mexico City and passengers going to 
Mexico City. The sample frame included all inbound and outbound flights between Frankfurt 
and Mexico during the period with a total of 1,418 passengers [Personal Communication from 
the Airline]. The interviews were conducted by one interviewer and took around 5 minutes to 
complete. Interviews were held in either German or English. 
 
Participants  
All passengers (age 14 upwards) who were travelling to or from Mexico were eligible for 
inclusion in the study. A smaller number of interviews were also carried out with airport staff 
who had close contact with passengers coming from affected regions. These included baggage 
claim personnel who assist travellers with enquiries about lost baggage and special care 
service employees who look after passengers with special needs in the terminal. We also 
interviewed customs officers who are often required to have body contact with passengers 
while screening for contraband.  
We developed an interview guide for use with passengers, which contained 5 questions 
concerning information needs and fear levels (additional material 1). A similar 8-item 
interview guide was used with airport staff (additional material 2). For passengers, interview 
questions focused on departure and final destination; what information they had received 
about swine flu; what, if any, information needs they still had; and their current level of fear 
about swine flu on a scale of 0 (least fear) to 4 (most fear). For staff, the questions focused on 
their work routine; when they first heard about swine flu; when they were provided with 
information by the employer; what further information needs and wishes they had; and how 
they would classify their current fear level on a scale of 0 to 4.  
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Analysis 
Fear scores were categorised as “0” no fear; “1-2” moderate fear; and “3-4” high fear. For 
statistical analyses contingency tables were performed as well as Chi-square tests for trend; 
where appropriate the Fisher’s exact test was used. For the comparison of fear levels the 
Kruskal-Wallis-test was performed. Responses to open-ended questions were written down by 
the interviewer and subsequently categorized into the semantic answer.  
 
Results 
Participants 
Of a total of 1,418 passengers (airline information) we approached 91 passengers (6.4%) to 
take part in the interview; 88 (97%) agreed to be interviewed. Of the staff groups we 
interviewed 100% (5/5) of the customs officers responsible on April, 29 for returning 
passengers from Mexico; 100% of special care service staff of the day shift on day one (2/2) 
and 50% on day two (1/2); and 50% (5/10) of the baggage claim day shift staff on day one. 
All staff groups in close contact with the returning passengers are represented in the sample. 
The demographic characteristics of both groups (travellers and staff) are given in table 1; the 
final destinations of the participants are given in table 2.  
 
The information status of passengers 
Only 19 of 50 (38%) inbound passengers had received the airline leaflet. We have no 
information why only 38% received information at the departing airport in Mexico. However, 
for those who had received it, it was their main information source. The information 
distribution at Mexico City Airport was described by passengers as poor. 12 passengers said 
they had received no information at all at the airport. Despite this, 35 of 50 (70%) felt 
sufficiently informed, primarily because of external information sources, for example the tour 
operator information service (mentioned by 13 participants), information from the media DICKMANN ET AL. (2009): NEW INFLUENZA A/H1N1 (“SWINE FLU”) - INFORMATION NEEDS OF AIRPORT PASSENGERS AND STAFF 
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(mentioned by 19 participants) and information given by the doctors in Frankfurt on every 
plane from Mexico who checked the passengers at arrival. For outbound passengers, 26 of 38 
(68%) had received the airline information leaflet. Four participants told us that they had 
consulted their GP before departure and travelled with Oseltamivir, masks and other 
protective equipment in their luggage. Consulting a GP was only reported on the second day 
of our investigation, possibly as a result of increased public alertness.  
 
The information needs of passengers 
35 of the 50 (70%) inbound travellers reported no further information needs. Those who had 
further information needs wanted to gather more information about medical (symptoms) and 
organisational (“what to do if I develop symptoms”) issues. Of the outbound passengers 
travelling to Mexico only 12 of 38 (32%) had no further information needs. Most requested 
more information about protective behaviour (mentioned by 14 participants), the management 
of disease (8 participants), precise information about ongoing situation (6/38; 16%), contact 
details for health care services (5 participants) and the impact on daily life and future public 
health restriction (4 participants). 
 
Fear level and information needs for passengers 
The fear level for outbound passengers was significantly higher than for inbound passengers 
(p<0.05). In addition outbound passengers had substantially more information needs 
(p<0.001) compared to inbound passengers (table 3; figure 1). There was a highly significant 
relationship between fear level and information needs (p<0.001). Passengers who had a high 
fear level typically reported continuing information needs whereas passengers with a low or 
moderate fear level reported that they had sufficient information (table 3). This relationship 
was not affected by gender. Qualitative analysis of the data suggested that fear level and 
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passengers with high anxiety reported needing more information about the recognition of 
relevant symptoms and a general awareness of contracting the disease. Outbound passengers 
with high anxiety needed more information about symptoms and medical advice.  
 
Perception of public health measures among passengers 
Arriving passengers had a generally positive perception of the public health measures adopted 
by the airport authorities. Even though we did not specifically ask about it, 13 of 50 (26%) 
respondents spontaneously gave positive feedback about the doctors on their plane as good 
communicators and as a primary source of information. Only 3 of 50 (6%) were critical about 
the public health measures, saying that the doctors screened people too quickly.  
 
Further wishes of passengers 
The additional comments made by inbound passengers included suggestions that they would 
appreciate a website by the airport offering relevant information about the situation and public 
health measures which arriving travellers could expect to encounter. Outbound passengers 
wished to have more protection equipment provided (masks) and needed more security advice 
for their trips.  
 
Information status of staff 
All employees had heard about swine flu over the weekend (25./26.04.09) in the media; in 
addition, two were phoned by colleagues over the weekend to inform them about the swine 
flu situation at the airport. Although they were exposed to returning passengers from the 
beginning of the outbreak, employees received their first official information from their 
employer relatively late: only two received a reading file on Monday (27.04.09), two received 
an email, two received a leaflet on Tuesday (28.04.09), three reported that they received 
information only after their own request on Wednesday (29.04.09) and one read information DICKMANN ET AL. (2009): NEW INFLUENZA A/H1N1 (“SWINE FLU”) - INFORMATION NEEDS OF AIRPORT PASSENGERS AND STAFF 
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on the intranet on Wednesday (29.04.09). Three employees reported that they had received no 
information at all from the employer. Despite the worrying news from the media the 
employer’s message was that there was no need to worry, because planes were assessed by 
the public health to be ‘clean’. That this assessment was incorrect became obvious after the 
first infection among airport staff occurred in Germany. 
 
Information needs of staff 
Eleven employees had further information needs: about the protection measures, about 
symptoms and treatment and about their employer’s policy regarding staff protection. The 
main communication problem identified was the recommendation by the employer that they 
should not wear masks even when in close contact with passengers from affected regions. 
This recommendation caused concern and misunderstanding, particularly because many of the 
passengers the staff were in contact with were wearing masks.  
 
Further wishes of staff 
The airport staff reported a desire to have a better medical and organizational briefing by a 
‘real’ person and not just through leaflets or a reading file (mentioned by 11 participants). 
They felt at risk as first responders and needed not only information, but also attention and 
care from their employer. Most of them requested more practical advice for personal 
protection behaviour because the usual recommendation - keep your distance and wash hands 
frequently – did not seem feasible for their work place. All felt the need for an understanding 
by their employer for their work in terms of care, attention and acknowledgement.  
 
Fear level of staff 
The fear levels of the airport staff were very high (table 3) - which can be understood  DICKMANN ET AL. (2009): NEW INFLUENZA A/H1N1 (“SWINE FLU”) - INFORMATION NEEDS OF AIRPORT PASSENGERS AND STAFF 
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as a result of poor information level mixed with the difficult message about the corporate 
protection policy (no masks).  
 
Discussion 
Relation between anxiety and information needs 
Our data suggested that a close relationship exists between anxiety and information needs: 
passengers and airport staff with a high fear level also had a poor information level. While we 
cannot be certain about the direction of causality implied by this association a parsimonious 
conclusion is that better information would assist in reducing anxiety in this population 
(Bowler 1994).  
Further we conclude that inbound and outbound passengers as well as airport staff have 
relevant but different information needs: while inbound passengers wanted information about 
the management of the disease and medical and organisation procedures, outbound passengers 
needed to know more about protective behaviour, the evolving situation and contact details 
should they develop symptoms. Airport staff needed more information about the infectivity of 
the disease and appropriate protective behaviour in their work place. Tailored information for 
inbound and outbound passengers and for staff could meet these different needs. For the 
different fear levels of outbound passengers we observed that the information needs differed 
according to the fear level: low fear level participants needed information about protective 
behaviour; moderate fear participants needed information about symptoms; high fear 
participants needed both: protective behaviour and symptoms. This finding may have 
implications for future risk communication policy. 
 
Information, Exposure and Fear Level 
We found no significant relation between fear level and actual or potential exposure. Lack of 
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exposure alone is not sufficient to meet information needs and/or reduce anxiety. As such any 
communication policy aimed solely at those exposed will be incomplete. Risk perception was 
more closely linked to emotional response and need for information than actual exposure. 
Thus the finding that those who were potentially exposed but reported adequate levels of 
information were not particularly anxious, whilst airport staff who felt potentially exposed but 
reported a lack of information were indeed anxious. This emphasises the importance of 
providing relevant information to airport staff as quickly as possible during an infectious 
diseases outbreak. 
The association between poor information, uncertainty and anxiety has been noted several 
times before in the literature (Slovic 1987, Sandman 2009). Particularly for incidents where 
the health threat comes from a novel pathogen or chemical, uncertainty about the threat, 
conflicting messages from experts and the media, and confusing terminology or jargon can all 
result in increased levels of fear among the public (Speckhard 2002). Reducing uncertainty 
through the provision of clear information is therefore seen as important in its own right 
(Vyner 1988). A transparent information policy could help to reduce anxiety and irrational 
behaviour (Ofri 2009). Infection control measures rely mostly on individual behaviour, with 
effective communication enabling people to adopt that behaviour. This should be reflected in 
the future risk communication policy.  
 
Perception of Public Health Measures: Personal Briefing 
Doctors who checked the arriving passengers from Mexico in the inbound planes were seen as 
an appreciated, authentic and trustable source of information and participants welcomed their 
offer to address questions. The same is reported from the airport staff who stressed their need 
to have a ‘real person’ to inform, explain and answer questions (cf Rubin et al. 2007). 
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Relevance of Information  
The relevance of timely and precise information is highly valuable in the management of 
infectious diseases (Jones & Salathe 2009). Information can reduce anxiety and enable public 
to behave appropriately to the evolving situation. Information and communication networks 
are the most effective instruments in the management of global outbreak while a prophylaxis 
or a specific pharmaceutical treatment is not yet available (Funk et al. 2009). Using the 
metaphor of the generic and specific human immune system, communication is the generic 
protection in the defensive process while prophylaxis and pharmaceutical treatment is the 
specific and adapted protection mechanism, which comes at a later stage. 
 
Methodological limitations 
Spreading outbreaks of potentially life threatening diseases can have an enormous effect on 
global economy, social life and health security (Gottschalk & Preiser 2005, Chang et al. 
2004). Government and health protection authorities have a legitimate and pressing duty to 
prevent the import of swine flu cases, where possible. Assessing the impact of such measures 
needs to be done swiftly – hence we started this study within two days of the onset of the 
crisis in Germany. However, this meant that the sample was opportunistic, and not all 
measures equally validated. Data collection was also only possible over a two day period, 
because of aviation security legislation limiting access to secure areas for non essential staff. 
Several specific caveats should therefore be borne in mind when evaluating this study. First, 
our use of convenience sampling may have biased the sample, with only those travellers or 
members of staff who were particularly interested in the topic being included in the sample. It 
is possible that we over-estimated the true level of concern within the population.  
Second, due to logistical reasons we were unable to conduct interviews in Spanish, meaning 
that we may have a particularly unrepresentative sample for travellers arriving from Mexico.  DICKMANN ET AL. (2009): NEW INFLUENZA A/H1N1 (“SWINE FLU”) - INFORMATION NEEDS OF AIRPORT PASSENGERS AND STAFF 
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Third, given the open-ended nature of our questions, it is difficult to determine what the 
genuine frequency of the various issues that we identified were in our sample. Had we used 
direct questioning with specified response options, the frequencies that we obtained may have 
been different.  
Fourth, the location of our interviews may also have created some artefacts in our results. As 
travellers had not yet left the airport by the time of their interview, it is possible that some 
would have obtained more information after our interviews were concluded. We may 
therefore have underestimated the effectiveness of the communication within the airport.  
Nonetheless, the importance of identifying key perceptions and communication difficulties 
during the very early stages of the swine flu outbreak outweighs these concerns. Had we 
delayed data collection by even a matter of days, public perceptions relating to swine flu 
would have been quantitatively and qualitatively different (Jones & Salathe 2009)  
 
Conclusions 
Airports are likely to be at the frontline of any future major infectious disease outbreak. 
Public health measures at a country’s airports will play a large role in determining if and 
when a novel infectious disease enters the country. Providing information to inbound and 
outbound passengers, and to airport staff, should be seen as an integral part of these measures. 
This study has identified three ways in particular of maximising the effectiveness of this 
information. First, tailored information should be provided to these three groups, in order to 
tackle the different information priorities that they seem to have. Second, supplementing 
written information with an in-person briefing by a trusted source such as a doctor appears to 
be an effective way of reducing anxiety. This is particularly valuable if the communicator is 
able to take questions from the passengers and staff members. Third, information should 
include facts about symptoms of the disease and its incubation period, as well as advice on 
adequate preventive behaviour. The passenger leaflet only contained information about the DICKMANN ET AL. (2009): NEW INFLUENZA A/H1N1 (“SWINE FLU”) - INFORMATION NEEDS OF AIRPORT PASSENGERS AND STAFF 
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symptoms of the disease and advice on what to do if the passenger experienced these 
symptoms. We consider it useful to include recommendations for the prevention and strict 
personal hygiene to limit the spread the disease.  
Actual exposure risk is not the key determinant of public anxiety and desire for information, 
in contrast to the personal perception of being at risk. Risk communication strategies should 
address not only the exposed or potentially exposed but also the group that feels at risk in an 
appropriate and respectful way.  
Our findings suggest ways to improve information provision in airports which plays a crucial 
role in the management of infectious diseases and pandemic outbreaks. Future research is 
needed to design more effective communication strategies. DICKMANN ET AL. (2009): NEW INFLUENZA A/H1N1 (“SWINE FLU”) - INFORMATION NEEDS OF AIRPORT PASSENGERS AND STAFF 
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APPENDIX B – ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 
 
Passenger Questionnaire 
Questions: 
1. From what departure airport are you coming – and what is your destination? 
 
2. Were you given any information about Swine flu at your departure airport? [YES or NO] 
 
If yes "What did they tell you?" 
  
3. What kind of information or advice would you find helpful at your destination? 
 
4. On a scale of 0 to 4, where 0 is not at all and 4 is very much, how concerned are you about 
coming into contact with Swine Flu during your air travel today? 
 
5. Can I ask which of these categories you fit into?  
a) Men aged 18-30 (n=5) 
b) Women aged 18-30 (n=5) 
c) Men aged 31-60 (n=5) 
d) Women aged 31-60 (n=5) 
e) Men aged 61 plus (n=5) 
f) Women aged 61 plus (n=5) DICKMANN ET AL. (2009): NEW INFLUENZA A/H1N1 (“SWINE FLU”) - INFORMATION NEEDS OF AIRPORT PASSENGERS AND STAFF 
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Airport staff  
Questions 
1. Place of work/duties 
2. Working time overlapping with the beginning of disease (did you work over the weekend? 
Monday? Tuesday?) 
3. When did first hear about swine flu? And where from (TV, newspaper, colleagues)? 
4. When did your employer inform you about swine flu? What did he tell you/what can you 
remember? 
5. Do you have further information needs from your employer? 
6. If you could wish: what do you want your employer to do for you (behaviour of the 
employer question)? 
7. On a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very high): can you classify your fear of contracting the 
virus? 
8. Male/female, age  DICKMANN ET AL. (2009): NEW INFLUENZA A/H1N1 (“SWINE FLU”) - INFORMATION NEEDS OF AIRPORT PASSENGERS AND STAFF 
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Tables 
Table 1: Basic data of participants 
Passengers  Gender  No.  Total  Age 
female  24  14-79 
inbound 
male  26  26-61 
inbound Sum    50  14-79 
female  17  14-69 
outbound 
male  21  18-69 
outbound Sum    38  14-69 
Subtotal  88  14-79 
  Airport staff/employees 
female  4  42-52 
Employees 
male  2  26,40 
Employees Sum    6  26-52 
female  1  26 
Customs officer 
male  3  36-50 
Customs officer Sum    4  26-50 
female  2  27,59 
Special care services 
male  1  55 
Special care services Sum    3  27-59 
Subtotal    13  26-59 
 
Total    101  14-79 
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Table 2: Direction of passengers after arriving to destination (inbound) 
Means of 
transportation 
Direction  No. 
Sum 
National  13 
Train 
International  4 
17 
National  8 
Aircraft 
International  9 
17 
National  4 
Car 
International  0 
4 
unknown    2  2 
Sum      40 
 
Frankfurt City    10  10 
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Table 3: Fear level and information needs of passengers and airport employees/staff 
  Outbound 
passengers 
(n=38) 
Inbound 
passengers 
(n=50) 
Airport staff 
 
(n=13) 
None (0)  14 (37%)  34 (68%)  1 (8%) 
Moderate (1-2)  14 (37%)  10 (20%)  5 (38%)  Fear level 
High (3-4)  10 (26%)  6 (12%)  7 (54%) 
Yes  26 (68%)  19 (38%)  6 (46%)  Receipt of 
leaflet  No  12 (32%)  31 (62%)  7 (54%) 
Yes  42 (71%)  17 (29%)  11 (85%)  information 
needs  No  8 (28%)  21 (72%)  2 (15%) 
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Figure 1: Information need: fear level and inbound/outbound flight 
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